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Abstract : Touch seems to enjoy some epistemic advantage over the other senses when it comes 
to attest to the reality of external objects. The question is not whether only what appears in tactile 
experiences is real. It is that only whether appears in tactile experiences feels real to the subject. In 
this chapter we first clarify how exactly the rather vague idea of an epistemic advantage of touch 
over the other senses should be interpreted. We then defend a “muscular thesis”, to the effect 
that only the experience of resistance to our motor efforts, as it arises in effortful touch, presents 
us with the independent existence of some causally empowered object. We finally consider 
whether this muscular thesis applies to the perception of our own body.  
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“Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print 
of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe.” (John, 20: 25).  
Thomas’s emphasis on touch echoes the long-standing idea that touch enjoys some epistemic 
advantage over the other senses when it comes to attest to the reality of external objects. This 
tactile preference can be found as early as in the atomists, as Plato depicted them, “who think 
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nothing is except what they can grasp firmly with their hands” (Theaetetus, 155e), and “maintain 
stoutly that alone exists which can be touched and handled” (Sophist, 247c). The epistemic 
privilege of touch has been constantly recurring in philosophical writings since then1 and appears 
to be constitutive of our ordinary thinking as well, as reflected in our use of “tangible” as a 
synonym for “real”.  
In this chapter we first clarify how exactly the rather vague idea of an epistemic advantage of 
touch over the other senses should be interpreted. We then defend a “muscular thesis”, to the 
effect that only the experience of resistance to our motor efforts, as it arises in effortful touch, 
presents us with the independent existence of some causally empowered object. We finally 
consider whether this muscular thesis applies to the perception of our own body.  
 
1. What privilege? 
 
1.1 A more reliable sense?  
A first way to interpret the epistemic privilege of touch is in terms of its reliability. This is the 
view adopted by Descartes among others (see also Kant, 2006, §17; Schopenhauer, 1958, Bk II, 
chap. 3):  
Of all our senses, touch is the one considered least deceptive and the most secure  
(Descartes, 1998, 5).  
Why should it be so? A common hypothesis is that unlike auditory or visual objects tactual 
objects are in contact with our body, and thus at least one kind of misperception is excluded: those 
that arise from perturbations in the perceiving medium: 
there are fewer ways of going wrong about what we touch than there are about what we 
see. Our eyes may deceive us, and our eyes may be deceived. Mirrors, sleight of hand, 
 
1 See Massin, 2010 (13-15) for references. 
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queer conditions of light or atmosphere, mirages and visions, optical illusions, even 
ordinary perspective –in all sorts of cases, for various reasons and in various ways, we 
may be led into mistakes. It is much less easy, though not of course impossible, to play 
tricks on the sense of touch. After all we are always very close to what we touch, and we 
are not dependent upon a variable intervening ’medium’. (Warnock, 1953, p. 54; see also 
Heider, 1959, pp. 19-20) 
However, one may question whether touch is a contact sense (Fulkerson, 2014), and correlatively 
one may consider the body as a tactile medium (Massin and Monnoyer, 2003; Vignemont and 
Massin, 2015). The spatial content of tactile experiences are indeed structured by bodily 
awareness: one feels pressure on one’s right hand thanks to the awareness of the structural 
organization of one’s body (O’Shaughnessy, 1980; Martin, 1993). The fact is that one can play 
many tricks on bodily awareness, and thus on the sense of touch. For instance, if you are touched 
on two spots on your finger after observing the image of a smaller version of your hand, you 
experience the distance between the two tactile stimuli as relatively smaller (Taylor-Clarke et al., 
2004). This is just an example of the many ways that the complexity of bodily awareness can pave 
the way for a variety of tactile illusions. We do not believe that such criticisms are fatal to the 
view of a higher reliability of touch but we think that they have together sufficient weight to shift 
the burden of proof to the upholder of this approach. 
 
1.2 A more materialist sense? 
A second way of interpreting the hypothesis of an epistemic advantage of touch is to argue that 
only touch gives us direct access to material objects or properties and to assume that material 
objects or properties are in some sense prior or more fundamental that non-material ones. 
Touch is the sense that gives us ’access to reality’, because even in immediate tactual 
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perception the object of perception is something material. (Armstrong, 1962, p. 31)2  
We agree that touch, more than the other senses, gives access to material objects or properties 
(see Vignemont and Massin 2015 for a proposal along these lines). Bracketing complex issues 
about fundamentality, we also agree that material objects or properties are in some sense more 
fundamental that non-material ones (such as phenomenal colors or sounds). One question, 
however, is why material entities are ordinarily conceived of as being more fundamental than 
non-material ones. Perhaps the reason of our naïve materialism is that material entities are 
accessed through touch, which enjoys some epistemic advantage over other senses. That is, 
rather than explaining the epistemic privilege of touch by appealing to ordinary preference for 
matter, one may want to explain our ordinary preference for matter by appealing to our ordinary 
preference for touch, as suggested by Bennett: 
If one could explain the differences between primary and secondary qualities by 
adducing facts about their respective sensory bases or correlates, I suspect that the crux 
of the explanation would turn out to be the fact that the sense of touch –or rather of 
touch­and­movement– is involved in all the primary qualities in a way in which it isn't 
with any of the secondary. But that is only a suspicion. Someone should write a book on 
the epistemology of the sense of touch.  (Bennett, 1971, 102)  
Although we cannot deliver a book in defense of Bennett’s suspicion, we want at least to make 
room for it. Accordingly, the view that the epistemic priority of touch explains commonsense 
materialism (or the distinction between primary and secondary qualities) should not be precluded 
by one’s interpretation of the epistemic privilege of touch. But starting from the assumption that 
material properties are prior to non-material ones does seem to preclude such an explanation. We 
thus turn to another account of the tactual privilege. 
 
 
2 See also Sanford (1967, 333); Strawson (Hampshire and Strawson, 1961, 107); Perkins (1983, 250-251 –who 
however rejects the view).  This may have been Aristotle’s view as well, as argued by Freeland, 1992. 
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1.3 A more realist sense? 
On our view, the epistemic privilege of touch is neither due to its higher reliability, nor to the 
materiality of its objects, but to the fact that only tactile perception presents us – under certain 
conditions – with its objects as being real, in a sense to be specified below. 
Let us readily dismiss a possible misunderstanding. The proposal is not that only what appears 
in tactile experiences is real. Two questions should be distinguished: one thing is to ask whether 
the objects of perceptual experience are real, another is to wonder whether their reality is 
experienced. Call these respectively the question of the reality of appearances and the question of the 
appearance of reality: 
1. Reality of appearances: are appearances real? E.g. Do the objects of our perceptions 
exist independently from us? 
2. Appearances of reality: do appearances seem real? E.g. Are the objects of our 
perceptions presented to us as existing independently from us? 
The question of the reality of appearances has historically drawn most of the philosophical 
attention. It is at stake in the debate between direct realists, indirect realists, and phenomenalists 
about perception. The question of the phenomenal character of reality has received 
comparatively less attention (see however Siegel, 2006; Campbell and Cassam, 2014, chap. 3), 
maybe because its answer seems obvious to many, for whom it is a basic phenomenological fact 
that the perceptual world appears to be independent from us. Crane, for instance, notes that: 
all (or almost all) serious theories of perception agree that our perceptual experience 
seems as if it were an awareness of a mind-independent world. (Crane, 2005; see also 
Strawson, 1979: 97, Allais, 2015: 53) 
Whatever the reason of the relative neglect of the question of the appearances of reality, the 
question matters for the ontology and the epistemology of realism. Samuel Johnson proposes to 
refute Berkeley’s immaterialism by kicking a stone with “mighty force” (Boswell, 1973, p. 292): if 
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Johnson’s stone is indeed presented as being real, then it becomes difficult for phenomenalists 
like Berkeley to maintain that appearances are to be taken at face value. Furthermore, if the stone 
indeed seems real, then there is an internalist answer to the question “on what grounds do you 
believe that the stone is real?” (whereby “internalism” we mean the view that such beliefs have 
justifiers of which one can become aware). The answer is the same as to the question: “On what 
grounds do you believe that the stone is round”, namely: “Because it seems so”. More precisely, 
that proposal is an application of one version of internalism: phenomenal conservatism (Huemer, 
2006, 2007). According to phenomenal conservatism, we are justified in believing that p if it 
seems to us that p (and if no defeaters appear to us). In the present case, we are justified in 
believing that x is real if it seems to us that x is real. As an internalist proposal, it may not readily 
address skeptical objections of the evil demon sort (see however Huemer 2007). But it may at 
least help us to refute other kind of objections against realism, such as the challenge –associated 
with “quietism”– according to which the notion of reality is not meaningful. If some things 
appear to be real, then one may answer to this challenge by arguing that predicate in “to be real” 
is as meaningful as the predicate “to be red”, insofar as the corresponding properties are 
accessible through experience. Our aim now is to specify in what sense touch can give rise to a 
specific appearance of reality. 
 
2. The muscular thesis 
Let us start with a description of a specific type of touch that has played a central role in the 
discussion of the epistemic advantage of touch, namely, effortful touch. All the examples 
provided in support of an epistemic privilege of touch involve some voluntary effort:  Plato’s 
atomists believe only in what they “can grasp firmly”; Thomas “thrusts” his hand into Jesus’ sides; 
and Samuel Johnson kicks a stone with “mighty force”. As it happens, the feeling of effort has often 
been ascribed an epistemic privilege akin to the one ascribed to touch: “There is no commoner 
remark than this, that resistance to our muscular effort is the only sense which makes us aware of 
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a reality independent from ourselves”, writes James (1880). The proposal has indeed a very rich 
history3. France is arguably the country where effortful touch has been granted most privileges. 
Malebranche (1991: 40-43) already argues that if resistance to our physical effort gives us reason 
to believe in the reality of solid bodies, then a fortiori, resistance to our will should give us reason 
to believe in the reality of ideas.4 Condillac (1997 [1754], Part II, Chap. V) argues that it is only 
when equipped with effortful touch and the capacity of motion that his statue becomes aware of 
a world distinct from itself.  But it arguably with Destutt de Tracy (1801) and Maine de Biran 
(2001[1812]), following him, that the idea of that effortful touch present us with the distinction 
of the external world from ourselves received for the first time a careful formulation.  
That touch and efforts are granted similar epistemic privilege is no accident, we take it. There 
are not two different kinds of experiences – the feeling of effort on the one hand, and tactile 
experiences on the other hand– which present us independently with the reality of external 
objects. Instead, there is one complex form of tactile perception, called effortful touch, which 
provides us with an exclusive entry point to the reality of external objects. 
 
2.1 Efforful touch 
What is effortful touch? It involves four ingredients: cutaneous pressure sensitivity, muscular 
sensitivity, effortfulness, and the sensation of effortfulness. 
(i) Cutaneous pressure-sensitivity.  
 
3 See Massin (forthcoming) for detailed references. 
4 Arguments of the sort, we think, pass too quickly from the premise that x cannot be modified at will to the conclusion 
that x resists to our will. Another possibility is that x is a kind of thing that we cannot want or try to modify: with 
respect to idea, and other phenomena which are beyond our agentive powers, we might be in a state of aboulia, rather 
than in a state of being impeded (see Massin, 2010, 652).  Note that Descartes (1993: 101; 2000, Seconde Partie, §1) 
had already pointed that we experience the fact that what we perceive comes from something else than ourselves, 
since cannot modify what we perceive at will.  
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By touch in the strict sense we here mean here the sense of pressure (de Vignemont and Massin, 
2015). Pressures and tensions are states of material entities (solids, liquids, gazes) that arise as a 
result of being acted on by several opposite forces. To exert two opposite inwards forces on both 
ends of a stick, as in pushing, amount to put the stick under pressure, and exerting two opposite 
outwards forces on such ends, as in pulling, amounts to put it under tension.  
(ii)  Muscular sensitivity.  
Tactile sensations are felt to be located in the parts of the body that is in contact with the objects 
such as the feet and the hands. By contrast, the muscle sense gives rise of perception of tension 
in our muscles and in some larger part of our body. The muscular sense, which is only a part of 
what Sherrington (1906) calls proprioception, involves muscle spindles, which are sensitive to 
muscle stretch, and Golgi tendon organs.5  
(iii) Effortfulness.  
Cutaneous pressures and muscular tensions can occur in absence of any intentional action of the 
subject. For touch to be effortful, the muscular tensions and continuous pressures felt must result 
from some activity of the subject. In short this means that one of the force constitutive of 
pressures or tensions must be intentionally exerted by the subject. More precisely, making a motor 
effort, we submit, amounts to:  
a. exerting a force (F1) on an object in order to make it move (or stay at rest) 
b. this intentionally exerted force being at least partly counterbalanced by an external 
opposite resistive force (F2): 
 
5 Joints receptors are involved in another species of proprioception which are not yet part from the muscle sense. 
The reason why we excludes such receptors from the muscle sense is that they are responsive to kinematic (and 
trigonometric) properties such as positions or motions, by contrast to muscle spindles and tendons organs, which are 




Opposite forces act on a same body, they have opposite direction and they may have different 
magnitudes. To say that they “counterbalance” each other is to say that each prevents (part of) 
the other from causing the acceleration of the body that it would have caused, had it acted on it 
alone (see Massin, 2016 for details). For instance, to make an effort to lift a bag is to exert some 
upward muscular force on it, which is at least partly counteracted by the weight of the bag –a 
downward gravitational force. That effort essentially involves some external resistive force allows 
one to understand the connection between effort and resistance: necessarily, in virtue of the 
nature of effort, if a subject makes an effort on some object then that object opposes some 
resistance to the subject’s effort. It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend such a force-
based account of efforts (but see Massin, 2010; forthcoming). 6   
What unifies these three features (pressure sensitivity, muscular sensitivity, effort) in a single 
perceptual system, we submit, is that at the heart of each of these stands a relation of opposition 
between forces: cutaneous pressures consist in antagonist inward forces being exerted on the dermis 
 
6 Three main aalternative accounts of efforts are (i) efforts are primitive feelings; (ii) efforts consist in, or arise from, 
a comparison between efference-copy of the order sent by the will, and the subsequent afferent signals received from 
the muscles; (iii) efforts consist in expending some energy or limited resource in order to reach one’s goal. 
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or epidermis; muscular tensions consist in antagonist outwards forces exerted on muscles; effort 
consists in exerting a force against an opposite one. 
(iv) The feeling of effortfulness.  
Effortful touch, as we use the term, does not only involve the exertion of a force against some 
resistive force, but also the feeling that one’s intentionally exerted force is resisted. Cutaneous 
and muscular sensitivity to pressures and tensions by itself only presents us with pressures in a 
passive way: the pressure between one’s back and the backrest of one’s chair, and the pressure we 
feel when a cat jumps on our knee, are not presented as constituted by a force we intentionally 
exert and another force that resists to it. In such passively felt pressures, the opposite forces felt 
are on an equal footing: none of them is intentional or resistive. In feeling efforts, by contrast, we 
experience one of the forces constitutive of the felt pressure as one force that we exert, and we 
experience the other force as a force that we do not exert and that resists to the force we exert. An 
effort consists in one intentionally exerting forces counteracted by a resistive force. 
Correspondingly, on top of the feeling of pressure or tension the feeling of effort involves agentive 
feelings, namely, the feeling of intentionally exerting some force that meets some opposition. 
We can now better understand the epistemic privilege of effortful touch. The thesis we 
propose, which we call the muscular thesis, is that effortful touch, and only it, provides us with 
an experiential access to the reality of external objects in the following sense: 
Muscular thesis: Only the experience of resistance to our motor efforts, as it arises in 
effortful touch, presents us with the independent existence of some causally empowered 
object. 7 
Accordingly, when we say that effortful touch is the only sense that present us its objects as being 
real, our sense of being real encompasses two main components: mind-independency and causal 
efficiency. Such a sense of being real is not pulled out of the hat but combines two common views. 
 
7 The contrapositive thesis has also been considered in some details: in the same way that effortfulness has been 
claimed to be the chief source of our knowledge of the distinction between ourselves and the world, effortlessness has 
been advanced as explaining cases in which the subject-object distinction vanishes. 
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A first influential understanding of being real is indeed to equate it with some relational property: 
that of being subject- or mind-independent. Something is real, on this understanding, if and only if it 
exists independently of us, by which is generally meant independently of mental episodes of ours 
directed towards it. Another common way of understanding being real, tracing back to Plato’s 
Sophist, is to equate being real with having causal power (see e.g. Armstrong, 1997, 41-43 Berto, 2012). 
Something is real if and only if it can act, or have an effect, on other entities. The sense of “real” 
that we adopt is a combination of both proposals: to be real is to have both mind-independent 
and efficient existence. Key to the reconciliation of these two understanding of “being real” is the 
idea that mind-independency, instead of being understood in terms of independency from 
perception, should here be understood in terms of independency from the will –where willing is 
understood as a kind of striving.8 
The privilege of effortful touch is thus the following: only effortful touch presents us with the 
contrast between ourselves as striving agents and an independent causally empowered being that 
resists our effort. We identify with the powerful being that exerts the first force – by contrast to the 
external being that exerts the resistive force. Thus, while passive touch is mute with respect to the 
self-world distinction, effortful touch, which brings in agency, discloses that distinction, and 
thereby, the reality of its objects.9 Only a certain kind of touch presents us with there being 
something that has causal power independent from us. That species of touch does not only 
present us with there being something beyond us; neither does it only present with there being 
something causally empowered. It presents us with both, at once. A tour de force. 
 
2.2 Feeling of reality in others senses  
 
8 On the idea that willing is a kind of trying or striving, see e.g. see e.g. Anscombe, 2002: §36; O’Shaughnessy, 1980: 
100;  Lowe, 1996: 157 sqq; 2000: 246 sqq;  McCann, 1998: 89; Massin, 2014. 
9 See e.g. Scheler: “reality is not given to us in perceptual acts, but in our instinctive and conative conduct vis-à-vis 
the world ». (Scheler, 1973 [1927] : 318). 
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The immediate corollary of our view is that in sight or hearing we are not presented with the 
reality of visual or auditory objects. This may seem obviously false: 
all (or almost all) serious theories of perception agree that our perceptual experience 
seems as if it were an awareness of a mind-independent world. (Crane, 2005; see also 
Strawson, 1979: 97; Cassam and Campbell, 2014, chap. 3; Allais, 2015, 53) 
Let us focus here on sight: is it the case that visual objects do no appear to be real in our sense? 
A first possible answer on behalf of the muscular thesis is to bluntly reject Crane’s description of 
our visual experiences and maintain that vision does not present us its object as existing 
independently from us. Such a view was indeed standard among modern philosophers, who 
regarded the experience of mind-independency as clearly impossible: 
As to the independency of our perceptions on ourselves, this can never be an object of 
the senses. Hume, Treatise, 1.4.2. (see also Berkeley, Principles, §18; Dialogues, 201; Reid, 
Inquiry, 687). 
None of these philosophers had the impression that such a view clashed with perceptual 
appearances, quite the contrary. Claiming that visual objects do not appear to exist independently 
of our perception of them does not necessarily commit one to an absurd account of the 
phenomenology of experience.  
This is so first because denying that existential mind-independency is presented in sight is 
compatible with other forms of subject-independency being visually presented. Siegel (2006) 
usefully distinguishes the subject-independence of the existence of a thing from the subject-
independence of the properties of that thing. For instance, changing one’s perspective relative to 
a tree does not change the perceived location of that tree. The subject-independence that is 
visually available here, however, does not concern the existence of the tree itself, but only its 
location. Moreover not experiencing visual objects as mind-independent does not entail 
experiencing them as mind-dependent. The present proposal merely assumes that visual 
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phenomenology is mute with respect to the mind-(in)dependency of its objects. Finally, the 
muscular thesis is compatible with the claim that the background beliefs of every perception may 
include a belief in the present existence of its objects, as Reid maintained. Reid endorses epistemic 
foundationalism with respect to such a belief: 
The sceptic asks me, Why do you believe the existence of the external object which 
you perceive? This belief, sir, is none of my manufacture; it came from the mint of 
Nature; it bears her image and superscription; and, if it is not right, the fault is not mine: I 
even took it upon trust, and without suspicion. (Reid, Inquiry, chap. 6 §20)   
The upholder of the muscular thesis may thus grant that in vision the existential belief arises 
irresistibly, although without being justified by the visual experience. By contrast, in the case of 
effortful touch there is another answer to the skeptic’s question: “Why do you believe the existence 
of the external object which you perceive?”. Namely, because it seems to exist apart from 
ourselves. Thus, one plausible proposal, we surmise, is this: all sensory perceptions come with an 
instinctive belief in the reality of their object. In all ordinary perceptual experiences, that belief in 
the reality of perceived objects is not justified by the content of perception –call this “Reidian 
foundationalism”. By contrast, effortful touch provides us, on top of this, with some experiential 
justification for this belief –in accordance with phenomenal conservatism. 
Although we confess being tempted by this bold line of answer – denying that mind-
independency is present in visual experiences – a second more cautious line of answer is available 
to us.  Recall that our sense of “real” is quite demanding: mind-independency and causal efficacy. 
Hence our proposal is compatible with sight presenting its object as mind-independent, as long 
as it does not also present its objects as causally empowered. This will still sound implausible to 
those who think that sight presents us with causal relations. But they may be convinced by the 
following comment: in effortful touch, we become aware not just of two causally empowered 
objects interacting in front of us, but of an interaction between ourselves and another external 
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causally empowered object. This causal contrast corresponds to the spatial contrast between the 
perception of the distance between two objects and the perception of the visual depth between 
some objects and oneself. Thus we need only deny that vision presents us with “causal depth”, 
that is, with our causal encounter with an external object. 
 
3. The body as one object among others? 
We argued in the previous section that it is in virtue of the feeling of resistance that tactile 
experiences provide the appearance of external reality. But do they also provide the appearance 
of bodily reality? In other words, does touch also have an epistemic advantage when it comes to 
one’s own body? One of the peculiarities of touch is its duality. So far we have focused on its 
exteroceptive dimension but tactile experiences are also bodily experiences: we feel the pressure 
of the ball on our hand. How is the hand presented to us in our tactile sensations?10  
 
3.1 The resisting body  
Let us consider the following bodily version of the muscular thesis. 
Muscular bodily thesis: The experience of resistance to our motor efforts presents us with 
the independent existence of one’s causally empowered body.11 
At first sight, the muscular thesis seems counterintuitive: efforts do not appear to break the 
normal unity of the body and the self, as famously described by Descartes in the Meditation VI: 
 
10 To be clear, the question here is not about self-touch. To some extent, touching one’s body is like touching a book 
or a chair. One might then claim that in self-touch I can become aware of the existence of my body in the same way 
as I am aware of the existence of other objects. But what we are interested in here is whether the appearance of 
bodily reality can be provided by the bodily component of tactile sensations. 
11 What is at stake here is not whether you experience this body as being your own (sense of bodily ownership), but 
whether you experience it as being you.  
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I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but that I am besides so 
intimately conjoined, and as it were intermixed with it, that my mind and body 
compose a certain unity.   
But should this normal unity between the subject and her body be conceived of as a 
counterexample to the muscular thesis? Let us analyze in detail four distinct cases, in which our 
body seems to resist to us. 
The heavy box: Your friend asks you to help him move out from his house. You must 
carry boxes full of books. One of them, however, is too heavy for you. You manage to lift 
it a little bit but not for long and it falls down on the floor. You are simply not strong 
enough.  
There is no doubt that one experiences effort while trying to lift a heavy box. There is also little 
doubt that one becomes vividly aware of one’s body and of its incapacity to lift the box. Yet in 
such a case, instead of describing one’s body as something that is causally empowered 
independently of the subject, one takes one’s bodily incapacity to be one’s own incapacity: “I 
cannot lift the box” is the natural description of the situation. If anything, then, pace the 
muscular thesis, such a situation reinforces the subject’s identification with her resisting body, 
rather than presenting it as distinct from her. This example, however, does not cast doubt on the 
muscular thesis. Indeed, what resists to the subject’s effort here is the box and in conformity to 
the muscular thesis, it does feel real. On the other hand, it is unclear that the subject experiences 
the resistance of her body. Instead, what she feels is the incapacity of her body to lift the box. 
Feeling of resistance and feeling of incapacity are two distinct, although tightly interrelated 
experiences. In particular, the feeling of resistance is largely sensory and instantaneous, whereas 
the feeling of bodily incapacity involves monitoring one’s performance over time, and can thus 
be qualified as being metacognitive along other noetic feelings (Vignemont, forthcoming-a). One 
can become aware of what one can and cannot do by exploiting two cues: the ratio of success to 
failure and the ease or difficulty associated with performing the movement. While the later indeed 
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consists in one’s feeling of effort, the former does not: the intensity of an effort is not essentially 
tied to its chance of success or failure: intense efforts can be vain, and slight efforts can be 
pointless. The feeling of incapacity is thus clearly distinct from the feeling of resistance insofar as 
it involves a more enduring awareness of agency (e.g., a repeated experience of failure). 
Furthermore, the sensations of resistance and effort normally lead to success, whereas one can 
repeatedly fail independently of any sensation of resistance. Suppose, for instance, that you try to 
move your arm by uttering “Move!” in your mind. Such an attempt to move your arm will fail, 
and repeatedly so, but it is unclear that it involves significant effort on your part. One may reply 
that repeating such a mental order on and on requires some effort. But the resistance involved in 
such an effort is not that of your arm, but rather of your mind. The next case will help to make 
that distinction clearer. 
The trek: Your friend invites you for a relatively challenging trek in the Swiss Alps. 
Although you rarely do any kind of sport, you decide to go but you soon realize that it is 
more difficult than expected. At the end of each day, you feel that you will never be able to 
make one more step and still you do it. Every morning when you wake up, you feel that 
you will never even be able to get up and still you do it. Until the last day, you struggle.  
Again, the subject’s body is not presented to her as being causally empowered independently of 
herself. Yet there is little doubt that she makes efforts. However, we need to distinguish between 
two kinds of effort. First, there is the physical effort to raise one’s legs. But there is also the 
mental effort to keep on walking instead of giving up. One should not reduce the sensation of 
making an effort on the body to the sensation of trying to move the body with effort – the latter not being 
sufficient for the former. For instance, Delboeuf (1881) argues that mountaineering efforts and 
physical efforts usually require making second-order mental efforts: efforts to overcome aversion 
to first-order physical efforts: the mountaineer struggles against the nagging temptation to stop 
on walking. On his view, the mountaineers’ effort is more mental than physical.  
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Mental efforts are ubiquitous. One may, for instance, talk of effortful hearing – e.g. listening. 
One may fear that if effort can be combined with any modality, then touch would lose all 
epistemic privileges. This is not so. Despite similar surface grammar, effortful hearing and 
effortful touch capture distinct categories of phenomena. Effort, we have here assumed quite 
standardly, is a goal-directed phenomenon: we make effort in order to achieve some goal. Now 
the goal of the effort involved in effortful hearing is typically to focus one’s attention on which is 
being heard, to understand what is being heard, or to listen: these are mental episodes. By 
contrast, the goal of the effort involved in effortful touch, is to move things around: that is, a 
physical, kinematic episode. If anything, mental effort present us with the resistance of our 
mental inclinations –of our distracted attention– not of physical bodies. Whether mental efforts 
present us thereby with the reality of our psychological tendencies is a question we leave here 
open. We are here concerned only with the muscular the muscular thesis, which is literally 
muscular: in so far at the mountaineer’s effort is mental, it does not constitute a counterexample 
to the muscular thesis. 
Still even Delboeuf grants that the mountaineer experiences a first-order physical effort, such 
as struggling against the weight of one’s body and making one step over a high rock. This 
muscular effort requires the mountaineer to exert an intense physical effort with her limbs, and 
she may use her hands to get over the rock, for instance. And yet it is unlikely that the feeling of 
resistance it prompts gives to the mountaineer the impression that her body is distinct from her. 
Why not?  Maine de Biran suggested that the body displays only a relative resistance because it 
obeys to one’s voluntary efforts whereas the rest of the world can display an absolute resistance 
that can be invincible. But this is hardly convincing. It is true that the external world can oppose 
a resistance so important that no effort can overcome it: no matter how hard we push the 
mountain with our hands, it will not move. However, the resistance of the external world does 
not need to be invincible to yield the impression of its reality: the swimmer who feels the 
resistance of the water to the motion of her hands has a clear sense of the mind-independence of 
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the causal power of the water. On the other hand, the resistance of our own body might be 
invincible: no matter how much we try, we cannot fly. Yet we do not experience the resistance of 
our body in the way we experience the resistance of the mountain.  
A this point the upholder of the muscular thesis might simply bite the bullet and insist that the 
tired mountaineer’s body really seems to her to exist apart from her. One should, however, first 
consider two other options open to the muscular thesis, which allow explaining the contrast 
between the resistance of our body and the resistance of objects external to our body. 
 The muscular thesis concerns effortful touch, which, we submitted, includes cutaneous 
pressure sensitivity. One may then suggest that what is missing in the mountaineering example is 
this latter component. It is only if one has both a muscular and a cutaneous feeling of resistance 
that one can have the impression that there is a mind-independent object at the origin of the 
force exerted against one’s body. When hiking, one can feel the contact of the floor on one’s feet 
and when lifting the box, one feels its pressure on one’s hands. But the sense of bodily resistance 
is not part of the passive tactile phenomenology; it is part of the kinesthetic effortful 
phenomenology. One may then suggest that the muscular thesis is equally a tactual thesis: it 
involves the sense of resistance but it needs to be experienced through touch for it to provide the 
appearance of reality. This would explain why one does not experience the body in the same way 
one experiences the mountain.12  
A second strategy consists in looking for defeaters to the mind-independent causal power of 
the body. There may be nothing missing in the case of bodily resistance but there may be 
something extra that prevents us to experience our body as being distinct from us. The fact is 
that in the cases described earlier, the sense of resistance is associated with pain: each of your 
muscles feels painful while hiking and you feel that you are breaking your back while trying to 
carry the box. Unless in very extreme circumstances, pain does not separate the self from the 
 
12 This account, however, is not satisfying if one assumes that proprioception and touch, which both consist in 
perceiving forces, belong to the same family (Massin and Monnoyer, 2003). 
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body but instead anchors it there: one does not feel distinct from one’s suffering body 
(Vignemont, forthcoming-b). If this analysis is correct, then one should have more the feeling of 
the independence of the body when there is bodily resistance with no pain. Consider the two 
following examples:  
The anarchic hand: After a brain lesion you suffer from the anarchic hand syndrome. 
You feel that you have no control over one of your hands, which is often undoing what 
your other hand is doing or displaying aggressive behavior toward you (including trying to 
strangle you). You try to stop your anarchic hand but it resists.  
The safety strap: You wake up and you see that you are in hospital. You feel that your 
legs are restrained by safety straps. You still try to move them a bit but you completely fail. 
You try again but the pressure exerted by the straps does not even increase and your legs 
remain still. You then realize that your legs are paralyzed. 
In both cases, patients can experience their body as being distinct from them. In the anarchic 
hand syndrome, patients do not deny that this is their own hand but they still deny that the 
movements performed by the hand are their own. The anarchic hand seems to have a will of its 
own (Pacherie, 2007). In other words, its causal power is experienced as being mind-independent. 
Paralyzed patients can also treat their legs as if they were alien or foreign to them, as if they were 
mere objects (Scandola et al., 2017). This seems to be in line with the muscular hypothesis. The 
problem, however, is that it is not clear whether the appearance of bodily reality in their cases is 
due specifically to the sense of bodily resistance. Indeed the paralyzed patients may try to move 
their limbs at the beginning but they soon give up because they have updated what they can and 
cannot do and do not attempt to perform actions that are impossible. They then have a feeling of 
bodily incapacity, but as said earlier, this is different from a feeling of resistance. The question is: 
do they experience a feeling of alienation towards their body exclusively at the beginning when 
they still try to move their limbs?  
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The fundamental problem that this question raises is that the sense of bodily resistance is at 
most occasional and there are good reasons for the normal lack of bodily resistance: actions are 
planned on the basis of the knowledge of one’s bodily capacities and to guarantee the success of 
one’s actions one generally plans only movements that are physically possible.  
The self-awareness of a self-consciously competent bodily agent includes a 
familiarity with the possibilities for bodily acting that come with having the kind of 
body she has: for instance, a familiarity with the different movements that are 
feasible at different joints. (McDowell, 2011: 142) 
It is thanks to the awareness of bodily possibilities that one does not over- or under-reach when 
trying to get an object. It is also thanks to it that one does not attempt to move in biologically 
impossible or painful ways. In short, the body does not resist because it does not have to: one 
usually asks only what it is possible for it to do. Hence, the sense of bodily resistance is the 
opposite of the way one normally experiences the control that one has over one’s body. One 
does not have to force one’s body to do things. Instead, one’s body typically obeys one’s will. The 
difference between controlling one’s body versus controlling another object is the transparency 
of the bodily medium and the fluidity of control. Therefore, experiencing the mind-independency 
of the causal power of one’s body is at most occasional and anecdotal, revealing the breaking 
down of the unity between the body and the self.  
 
3.2 Derealization and depersonalization: feeling of reality or of presence?   
To finish, we would like to consider a last potential objection to the account we have presented 
so far by analyzing in detail the two related psychiatric conditions of depersonalization and 
derealization. Depersonalized patient report that they feel detached from the world and from 
their body, as if they were external observers of their mental and bodily processes or as if their 
body had disappeared:  
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I do not feel I have a body. When I look down I see my legs and body but it feels as 
if it was not there. When I move I see the movements as I move, but I am not there 
with the movements. I am walking up the stairs, I see my legs and hear footsteps and 
feel the muscles but it feels as if I have no body; I am not there. (Dugas & Moutier, 
1911, p. 28, translated by Billon (2017)) 
Interestingly, these patients often feel the urge to touch their body or to pour hot water on it to 
reassure themselves of its existence. 
Even if I touch my face I feel or sense something but my face is not there. As I sense 
it I have the need to make sure and I rub, touch, and hurt myself to feel something. 
(Sierra, 2009, p. 29)  
Self-touch is thus used for them as a mean to try to re-establish their feeling of bodily objectivity. 
In the same way, we might pinch ourselves to make sure that we are not dreaming.  
Their behavior may at first sight appear as in line with the epistemic advantage of touch that 
we have defended so far. However, it is not clear how the syndrome of depersonalization fits 
with the muscular thesis. The difficulty is twofold. On the one hand, depersonalized patients 
experience the lack of reality of the external world and yet they can still experience the resistance 
of objects on their skin and their sense of effort is not disturbed (Billon, 2017). On the other 
hand, they no longer experience the reality of their body and feel alienated from it and yet they 
have no motor deficit and their body does not appear to resist more to them than to healthy 
individuals.  
These objections, however, are not fatal. They simply invite us to clarify further the view that 
we defend. One way to answer is to suggest that these patients suffer from a more fundamental 
disruption, namely, a disruption of the sense of the self.  Let us return to our origin proposal. We 
argued that self-world dualism finds its experiential origin in the experience of effortful touch. 
The main issue we were concerned with was how one was aware of external objects as being 
independent from the subject. In other words, we were interested in how to differentiate the 
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world from the self. But this question makes sense only if one has already a sense of self. 
However, in depersonalization this may not be the case. Billon (2017) argues that depersonalized 
patients have a fundamental distortion of subjectivity. They may feel resistance but they no 
longer experience their sensations as being their own. For effortful touch to provide the 
appearance of reality, one needs some level of self-awareness. In short, if there is no sense of the 
self, there cannot be a self-world dualism. On this view, these patients lack not only the feeling of 
presence, but also the appearance of reality normally provided by effortful touch despite their 
preserved tactile and motor abilities. The case of depersonalization thus does not invalidate the 
muscular thesis; it merely shows that effortful touch does not suffice for the appearance of 
reality:  one also needs subjectivity.  
An alternative reply is that these patients have lost is not what we target with our muscular 
thesis. As said earlier in our discussion of vision, we propose a highly specific definition of the 
sense of reality, according to which external objects are presented to us as having mind-
independent causal efficacy. In other words, in effortful touch one experiences that there is 
something that exerts the force that opposes us. One might then argue that patients who suffer 
from depersonalization/derealization do not lack this specific sense of reality. What they lack is 
something different. One might for instance suggest that they lack the feeling of presence only 
(Vignemont, forthcoming-a).   
The notion of feeling of presence has originally been proposed to characterize the distinctive 
visual phenomenology associated with actual scenes, which is lacking in visual experiences of 
depicted scenes (Noë, 2005; Matthen, 2005; Dokic, 2010). When you see a picture of your 
children, your experience of them feels different from the experience that you have when you see 
them in front of you: they do not feel as being here. Seeing an object as present involves being 
aware of it as a whole object located in three-dimensional space, as an object that one can explore 
from different perspectives and that one can grasp, while seeing a picture of the same object only 
involves being aware of its material surface with certain configurational properties. In the same 
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way that there is a feeling of presence associated with visual experiences of actual objects, we 
suggest that although there is no feeling of bodily reality as we defined it, there is nonetheless a 
feeling of bodily presence normally associated with bodily sensations: we normally experience our 
body as being ‘here’ in a space larger than our body (Vignemont, forthcoming-a). As Martin 
(1993) notes:  
In being aware of one's skin as a boundary of one's body, one has some sense of 
space extending beyond that boundary. (Martin, 1993, p. 213) 
The awareness of bodily boundaries and the awareness of a larger space are two facets of the 
same coin. Insofar as we are aware of the boundaries of our body, we are also aware that there is 
something beyond of these boundaries. Being aware of bodily boundaries indeed involves being 
able to contrast what is inside from what is outside. Martin follows that we are aware not only 
that there is a space larger than our body but also that our body is part of this larger space.  
We have a sense of ourselves as being bounded and limited objects within a larger 
space, which can contain other objects. (Martin, 1993, p. 211) 
When we feel touch on our hand, we experience the pressure in a specific location within the 
map of our body (i.e. bodily location), but we also experience this part of our body in a specific 
location in the external world (i.e. egocentric location). As O’Shaughnessy (1980) claims, bodily 
sensations are “sensations-at-a-part-of-body-at-a-point-in-body-relative-space”. Thanks to the 
egocentric locations of bodily sensations, the body that one feels is experienced as being here in 
three-dimensional external space.13  
 
13 Smith (2002) claims that bodily sensations are devoid of phenomenal three-dimensional spatiality because there 
cannot be any felt distance between the sense organ and the object since they are one and the same, namely, the skin. 
Consequently, one cannot occlude one’s bodily sensations by changing one’s spatial perspective on one’s body. This 
is true but this does not prevent bodily sensations to be experienced within an egocentric frame of reference 
(Vignemont, forthcoming-c). This is well illustrated by the Japanese illusion. Cross your wrists, your hands clasped 
with thumbs down. Then turn your hands in toward you until your fingers point upward. If now I touch one of your 
fingers, you will have difficulty not only in moving the finger that is touched, but also in reporting which finger it is. 
This difficulty shows that the relative location of body parts matters. Further evidence in favor of the egocentricity 
of tactile sensations can be found in the actions that we perform. As Evans (1985) defines it, the egocentric space is 
a “behavioural space”, the space within which one acts. Imagine that you feel an intense itching sensation on your 
back. It is true that you cannot occlude it by changing your perspective on it but you can still try to relieve it by 
scratching your back. In order for you to appropriately guide your actions towards your body you need information 
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Now experiencing something as being here or as being present is not the same as experiencing 
it as being real. Although feeling of presence and feeling of reality are often confused, we believe 
that it is important to keep them apart. Unlike the feeling of reality, the feeling of presence 
indeed is not specific to tactile phenomenology but can be found in all sensory phenomenology. 
It might even possibly be found in imagination and in dream, and we clearly do not experience a 
feeling of reality there. The feeling of presence only expresses the awareness of the spatial 
relationship between the perceived object and the perceiver. It may not be as fundamental as the 
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